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From connectedness and learning to European and national 
identity: results from fourteen European countries 
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− Fostering national and European identities can be compatible with education for tolerance. 
− Social relationships in school are important predictors of national and European identity. 
− Formal learning opportunities are especially important for fostering a European identity. 
Purpose: The aim of this article is to analyse the concepts of national and European identities 
through a multidisciplinary lens and to examine empirically how schools develop those identities 
in adolescents. 
Method: The study employs data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 
2016. Correlation and regression analyses are conducted with data from over 45,000 students 
from fourteen different European educational systems. Country-specific weighted statistical 
analyses are conducted. 
Findings: A combination of perspectives from the fields of psychology, political culture, and civic 
and citizenship education is useful to reflect upon the dimensions and desirability of overarching 
identities. Formal learning opportunities are shown to be particularly relevant for fostering a 
European identity. Positive relationships between students and teachers and between students 
statistically predict stronger identities. 
Practical implications: Good social relationships at school help to develop national and European 
identities. Moreover, the development of a European identity especially depends upon its explicit 
inclusion in the curriculum. Teachers should guide students to reflect on the meaning and content 
of tolerant and complex national and European identities. 
Keywords: European citizenship, national identity, European identity, learning opportunities, 
social relationships at school.  
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1 Introduction 
Education provides opportunities for equipping students with skills and for fostering development 
of attitudes and identities. In this paper, we will explore the role of national and European 
identities in the formative stage of adolescence. The present empirical analysis is based on the 
International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2016 (ICCS 2016). This study offers us the 
opportunity to glance at the formative effects of the school environment, where students are 
exposed to malleable formal and informal learning opportunities, which include instruction and 
social relationships in school.  
The European Union (EU) represents a political structure with a great impact on political 
decisions which affect the everyday life of European citizens. As such, it co-determines the cultural 
environment in which adolescents grow up, learn, and form their identities. This environment has 
recently experienced a backlash of enclosure and nationalism in many member states of the EU. In 
this context, questions of identity and processes of ‘othering’ are critically discussed in the public 
sphere.  
We will analyse the topic of national and European identities using three theoretical 
approaches: Theories from the field of psychology will be used to explore the relevance of identity 
formation for adolescent students. Theories regarding political culture will help us to understand 
why and which kinds of national and European identities can be valuable for the persistence and 
also development of the respective political structures. Finally, approaches from civic and 
citizenship education (CCE) will be used to offer practical and critical perspectives concerning the 
development of identities with (supra)national entities in school. For each discipline, we present 
theories that are suitable for providing a multidimensional understanding of adolescents’ political 
identities in the areas of tension between students’ development, societal need for stability, and 
opportunities for social change within the framework of ICCS 2016.  
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 Identity in ICCS 2016 
The International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS 2016) is organised by the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) and examines how 
students across the world are prepared for their role as citizens (Schulz et al., 2018). In particular, 
the study focuses on the political mindset of students and examines how school and learning 
environments outside of school contribute to relevant learning processes and outcomes. The 
political mindset of students can be categorised along four dimensions: identities, attitudes, 
participation, and civic knowledge (Abs, Hahn-Laudenberg, Deimel & Ziemes, 2017). We use the 
word mindset to convey that those aspects are meaningfully connected with each other. A strong 
national identity that is not underpinned by attitudes of tolerance can require different 
approaches towards CCE than, for example, the strong support for democratic values, a low 
perceived level of national identity, or low levels of trust in political institutions.  
Identity in a civic and cultural sense has been an emerging and broadening construct since the 
first international comparative IEA Civic Education Study in 1971. Since ICCS 2009, the notion of 
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students’ identity has evolved into more complex conceptions. For European countries, this 
conception of identity now includes questions concerning European identity in harmony with 
those exploring national identity (Hahn-Laudenberg, Jasper & Abs, 2017). Still, none of the 
internationally used scales included in ICCS 2016 acknowledges such hybrid affiliations which are 
signified by multiple combined identities (Arnett, 2015). While the aspect of hybridity cannot be 
(fully) mapped with the instruments available in ICCS 2016 (Hahn-Laudenberg, Jasper & Abs, 
2017), the instruments do offer a rich source for analysing questions of identity from a 
comparative perspective.  
The items measuring national and European identities are listed in Table 1. While the former 
focuses more on affective components of identity, such as pride and respect, the latter focuses 
more strongly on a feeling of belonging. Some of the items were already used in the CIVED 1999 
assessment labeled as national identity scale, for the purposes of ICCS 2009 the scale was adapted 
and renamed to ‘attitude towards the country of residence’. As will be discussed in the next 
section, national identity encompasses affective and evaluative aspects, both of which are 
represented in the items (Hahn-Laudenberg, Jasper & Abs, 2017).  
Table 1 
Items included in the identity scales in ICCS 2016 
National identity European identity 
The <flag of country of test> is important to me. I see myself as European. 
I have great respect for <country of test>. I am proud to live in Europe. 
In <country of test>, we should be proud of what 
we have achieved. I feel part of Europe. 
I am proud to live in <country of test>. I see myself first as a citizen of Europe and then as a citizen of the world. 
Generally speaking, <country of test> is a better 
country to live in than most other countries. 
 
Note. Answer options were ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’. 
 
2.2 National and European identity in psychology 
In this section, we focus on links between psychological theories and (supra)national identities. 
We conceptualise students as emerging citizens whose identities define their lasting relationship 
with their environment. Identity is the answer to the question: Who am I within my environment? 
According to Erikson (1959/1994), identity is fundamental for a positive development during 
adolescence. Young people form relationships with the world and explore social roles and 
meanings which will influence the course of their lives. Longitudinal analyses agree that lasting 
political attitudes are formed at this age (Meeus, 2011). Exploring new experiences and roles as 
aspects of identity seems to be an important driver of this formation (Marcia, 1966). Identity 
diffusion arising from avoidance of this development task and an exploration driven by external 
norms are generally seen as inhibitors of this process (Crocetti, Garckija, Gabrialavičiūtė, Vosyli, & 
Žukauskienė, 2014). Information-based approaches are considered to be highly productive in the 
formation of identity (Balistreri, Busch-Rossnagel, & Geisinger, 1995). Identities can be more or 
less complex. Theories on identity complexity refer to social identity theory, which elaborates on 
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multiple group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Less complex identities increase the risk that 
people belonging to an outgroup are devalued, while more complex identities increase 
opportunities for connecting with other people (Moshman, 2011; Prati, Moscatelli, Pratto, & 
Rubini, 2016).  
According to Barrett (2012), a sense of national identity contains cognitive and affective 
components and emerges during childhood around the age of seven. Sometimes it is connected 
with intense emotions and stereotypes even before the concept of a nation is fully understood. 
European identity was successfully assessed in children as young as ten (Agirdag, Huyst, & van 
Houtte, 2012). Before theories on identity complexity were widespread, European and national 
identities were conceptualised as competing. Newer approaches see the identity aspects as nested 
within each other (Westle & Buchheim, 2016). Still, Landberg et al. (2018) found subgroups of 
students who identified only with one aspect. The nested nature of European and national 
identities therefore remains a probabilistic, not a deterministic, one.  
In a sample of 107 British university students, Cinnirella (1997) found that British identity did 
not correlate with European identity and found a negative correlation with attitudes towards 
European integration. More recent studies with greater sample sizes from various countries found 
a stable positive relationship between European and national identities (Agirdag et al., 2012; 
Jugert, Šerek, & Stollberg, 2018; Markowski & Kotnarowski, 2016; Westle & Segatti, 2016).  
In the ICCS 2009 cycle, a great majority of students saw themselves as European. However, 
when asked if they saw themselves as European rather than as citizens of their country of 
residence, levels of agreement fell below 50% in all countries (Kerr, Sturman, Schulz & Burge, 
2010, p. 69). This indicates that students do not construct these identities in a conflicting manner 
unless explicitly asked to do so. 
While identity formation is considered to be an aspect of the healthy development of 
adolescents, the positive framing of developing a national identity is not undisputed. Especially in 
Germany, a certain scepticism towards national identity exists amongst citizens, political actors, 
and scholars. Especially the latter group worries that a strong sense of national identity will lead to 
violent nationalism and violence against vulnerable groups (Oesterreich, 2002, p. 27). From a 
purely psychometric point of view, these concerns have some foundation. If national identity 
follows a normal distribution, a higher mean would entail a higher amount of people with high 
absolute levels of identification. These concerns are based on the assumption that national 
identity transitions smoothly into nationalism with increasing strength.  
However, this psychometric view neglects current discussions on the qualities that identity can 
possess. Multiple scholars differentiate between civic national identity, which refers to the duties 
and rights of citizens within a country, and ethnic definitions of identity. People who share ethnic 
conceptualisations of national identity believe that being born in a country, sharing its culture and 
religion, and having ancestors from that country are fundamental prerequisites for truly belonging 
(Berg & Hjerm, 2010). This conception of identity is empirically connected to lower levels of trust 
in institutions and therefore is not an attribute of system stability (see 2.3). An experimental study 
was able to show that civic concepts of national identity can be fostered by increasing the salience 
of tolerance in the history of the country (Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2012).  
The items listed in Table 1 illustrate affective and evaluative aspects of identity. No external 
prerequisites, such as a place of birth or ethnicity, are mentioned. The third item regarding 
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national identity uses the plural pronoun ‘we’, which conveys that any reader may feel part of this 
community to some degree. The items on European identity focus on the individuals’ perceptions 
as well.  
2.3 Identity as political support 
Like psychology, the field of political culture allows a differentiation between various forms of 
national identity (Norris, 2011, p. 25), which is consensually regarded as an aspect of political 
support. After outlining a possible meaning of the term ‘political support’, we introduce the theory 
of the ‘critical citizen’ by Pippa Norris, who aims to reconcile stability with democratic 
transformations. Political support can be defined as the attitudes and behaviours on which 
political institutions rely in order to persist and to develop in line with the interests of the people 
they aim to represent (Easton, 1957, 1975). Social cohesion, as manifest in concrete collaboration 
and generalised trust, is acknowledged to be an important foundation of political support. From 
this point of view, social experiences of successful collaboration provide valuable ‘bridging social 
capital’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). Bridging social capital facilitates the collaboration of people from 
different groups, such as people living in different regions of the same country or different social 
groups. Bridging social capital is not believed to inhibit bonding social capital, which enables the 
collaboration within groups (Putnam, 2007). Putnam states that citizens are willing to collaborate 
on and invest their time in common goals of specific initiatives only if they have positive 
experiences with each other.  
According to the object or entity to which it relates, political support can be categorised from 
specific to diffuse (Easton, 1957). The recent reconceptualisation of political support is closely 
related to the original version but aligns aspects of political support more deliberately on a scale 
from more to less diffuse, rather than categorising the approaches themselves (Norris, 2011). 
Norris applies her systematisation to nations, but it can be generalised to apply to supranational 
institutions and probably to all political institutions that have a representative organisational 
structure. Identification with the political community can be seen as the most diffuse type and 
therefore the most fundamental aspect of political support. The more specific aspects of support 
are, in order of their increasing levels of specificity: approval of core regime principles and values; 
evaluation of regime performance; confidence in regime institutions; and approval of incumbent 
office-holders.  
Identity and citizenship are conceptually linked. While identity is multidimensional and not 
restricted to the political sphere, citizenship refers to the membership of an individual in a political 
community (mostly states) which is connected to rights and duties as well as practices. In this 
function, citizenship enables people to transform their personal identity-related issues into 
political ones (Isin & Wood, 1999). Conover (1995) conceptualises citizenship as a 
multidimensional concept which encompasses three components: membership, a sense of 
citizenship, and practice. Membership is signified by a legal status which comes with formal 
privileges and citizenship responsibilities. In contrast, ‘sense of citizenship’ is defined as the 
psychological meaning of citizenship, consisting of two elements: citizen identity as ‘the affective 
significance that people give their membership in a particular political community’ (p.134), and an 
understanding of the sense of beliefs, e.g. regarding citizen ideals. Conover states that ‘identity 
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provides the emotional energy, and understanding the substantive direction’ (p. 135). Based on 
this statement, she regards the individual’s sense of citizenship as the main motivation for civic 
practice.  
As many supporters of the EU claimed that the EU would help to overcome hostile nationalism, 
some scholars worried that identification with the EU or Europe might undermine national 
political support (Westle & Buchheim, 2016). As discussed above, empiric results from the last two 
decades do not indicate that such a negative connection exists or that identity as a source of 
political support is a limited or zero-sum resource. Like Landberg et al. (2018), Westle and 
Buchheim (2016) find only a small group of people who identify with Europe much more than with 
their own country, and they are convinced that ‘a wholly European attachment will probably 
remain a marginal phenomenon’ (p. 127). What exactly it means to be European remains both 
elusive and a continuing object of discussion among scholars, policy makers, and citizens.  
Most scholars agree that particularly the more specific forms of political support can and must 
be earned by institutions and incumbents through the proper performance of their duties or roles. 
In her ‘critical citizen’ approach, Norris (1999, 2011) empirically shows and praises the ability of 
citizens to advance the democratisation of institutions through an incremental increase in their 
expectations arising from their education. Fuchs (2002) further states that the more diffuse 
aspects of support (identification and support of core values) can be seen as universally supportive 
and enhancing for democracies, while the more specific forms of support (trust in institutions and 
incumbents) can and should be more variable in order to hold office-holders and institutions 
accountable and to foster positive developments. The conceptualisations agree that a lack of 
identification on the part of members poses a problem for the persistence of systems. Both scales 
in ICCS 2016 can be interpreted as aspects of diffuse support. They assess very general feelings of 
connectedness without specifying certain events, institutions or incumbents.  
Conceptualisations of critical citizenship by Norris and other scholars by no means advocate 
national identification as a tool for appeasing citizens or as a distraction from the lack of 
opportunities for effective participation; rather, they illustrate, through theories and empirical 
results, that a common identity is the basis for collective action for democratisation and social 
change. 
2.4 European identity from the perspective of CCE  
Several scholars assert that ‘education is the primary instrument with which people can be 
socialized to think and feel as Europeans, an instrument through which a European identity or 
feeling of European citizenship could be nurtured in them.’ (Ollikainen, 2000, p. 7). Theories of 
political culture imply that schools need to foster national and European identities to stabilise the 
political system and motivate (emerging) citizens to actively engage with and improve their 
countries’ institutions. Print (2014) sees national and European identities as a goal of education; 
he states that identities and belonging are an aspect of social and psychological resilience in times 
of crisis, such as the global financial crisis. Indeed, since the 1988 Resolution of the European 
Council of Ministers, European policy documents have explicitly included the aim that (citizenship) 
education should ‘strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to 
them the value of European civilisation and of the foundations on which the European peoples 
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intended to base their development today’ (p. 5). This resolution (and more current, e.g. European 
Council of Ministers, 2015) influenced national policies of European citizenship education and 
curricula in the following years (Faas, 2007, p. 162). Faas identified Germany as a country with a 
strong European agenda, which is in accordance with the findings of the international comparative 
Eurydice report (Eurydice, 2017). In 1990, the German Council of Ministers of Education (KMK) 
stated that one goal of education was ‘to awaken in young people the consciousness of a 
European identity, to prepare them to be aware of their responsibilities as citizens of the 
European Community; and to promote mutual learning with young foreigners to foster the ability 
to feel mutual solidarity’ (see translation in Faas, 2007, p. 162). While (some) comparative papers 
and (inter)national policy papers consider the aim to strengthen European identity as a given 
(Ollikainen, 2000; Verhaegen, Hooghe, & Meeusen, 2013), other scholars—prominent, but not 
exclusive, in German discourse—oppose the idea that schools should intentionally foster the 
formation of national or European identities. Two lines of reasoning can be observed here. The 
first line indicates a conflict between CCE promoting, on the one hand, a specific identification or 
attitudes that reach beyond fundamental democratic values and, on the other hand, the 
imperative of non-indoctrination and controversiality (Oberle & Forstmann, 2015). Some 
observers criticise the concept of Education about Europe for being focused mainly on the goal 
that education should contribute to stabilising and legitimising the European political system, 
without paying heed to quality, democratic processes, or social justice. They point out that 
education might cover EU crises but not the sources of these crises, which may result from failed 
politics rather than from a lack of European identity (Klein, 2015; Richter, 2004). Instead of 
fostering a European identity as an ‘active European citizenship’ which would likely promote a less 
controversial education approach aimed at reproducing the existing political order, Biesta (2009, 
p. 154) calls for ‘civic learning that embod[ies] a commitment to a more critical and more political 
form of European citizenship’. Likewise, Lösch (2009) argues for global citizenship education and 
critical political education which focuses on democratisation and change to promote social justice. 
Considered within the framework of the critical citizen as described above, however, such 
concerns lose some of their impact and thus illustrate the value of theories of political culture for 
civic education discourses (see also Oberle, 2015). 
Second, conscious of the disastrous consequences that nationalism has had throughout 
German history, authors raise objections against fostering collective identities at school, as this 
may promote exclusion and intolerance (Eis, 2015; Richter, 2004). They assume that in most cases, 
this is associated with the perception of identity as a homogeneous cultural/collective identity 
(Leitkultur). Lösch (2009) warns that national identity is inherently linked to exclusion and 
discrimination and calls for caution before transposing concepts of national identity to the 
European level, as such a transposition would not solve the problem of exclusion but merely shift 
it from a national to a supranational level. In this view, CCE should not only clarify the legal and 
political framework but also subject the social and cultural mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion 
to reflection and critique (Eis, 2015).  
These objections apply in particular to the ethnic conceptions of identity described earlier. 
There is a lack of consensus regarding the definition of a European identity which, in turn, hinders 
a differentiation between inclusive and exclusive conceptions. For example, Delanty (2005) states 
that ‘[to] be European is simply to recognize that one lives in a world that does not belong to a 
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specific people’ (p. 19) indicating that being European is fundamentally linked to the impossibility 
of exclusion on the basis of an ethnic understanding of citizenship. Richter (2004) outlined a 
matching educational approach under the label ‘Doing European’ that emphasises the individual 
and ongoing process of identity construction. The idea of doing identity can be closely connected 
to the concept of complex identities, which underlines that the sense of belonging can be 
individually constructed in a multifaceted and changing way. Anglo-American traditions are more 
optimistic regarding the possibilities of reconciling national identity and the pursuit of social 
justice. Norris (2011) emphasises the role that high-level competencies play in the ability to 
criticise institutions, and Banks (2017) states that ‘the teaching of critical patriotism should be a 
priority in schools’ (p. 369). This reflects back on the different ways in which national and 
European identities can be conceptualised. 
Regardless of their theoretical approach, most scholars agree that national and European 
identities can have significantly different qualities, which can make the crucial difference between 
a violent approach and a tolerant and active approach to identity. Only with this differentiation in 
mind can we ask which form of a national or a European identity can and should be fostered. 
2.5 Didactic structures and interventions for identity formation 
While the previous sections discussed the nature and relationship as well as the desirability of 
fostering national and European identity in adolescents, this section will provide a comprehensive 
overview of the methods used to foster these identities in schools and to what extent their 
assessment was incorporated in ICCS 2016 study. Compared to the aim of fostering European 
identity itself, the tools for fostering such a European identity seem cause less controversy.  
First, offering formal, and compulsory learning content about Europe and the European Union 
is the key for imparting a conceptual understanding of political processes at the European level 
(Oberle, 2015), and is also discussed in the context of fostering a European identity (Verhaegen et 
al., 2013). Learning a European foreign language at school and the participation of schools (and 
universities) in student exchange programmes (Oberle, 2015; Ollikainen, 2000) are widely 
accepted as substantial contributions to the formation of an identity as a European citizen (for a 
critical empirical review, see Verhaegen et al., 2013).  
Verhaegen and Hooghe’s (2015) analyses of the ICCS 2009 cycle’s data show that cognitive 
learning about Europe can explain differences in the levels of European identity. Conversely, 
Oberle and Forstmann (2015) report that for a sample of 885 German students, lessons about the 
EU or EU knowledge have no effect, whether direct or indirect, on the development of a European 
identity.  
Beyond decisions concerning the curriculum, the second relevant factor turns out to be 
instructional design. Encouraging discussions on topics which are controversial in society or in the 
scientific community enables broad explorations of possible selves and opinions. According 
Marcia’s (1966) identity model, open discussions should lead to a greater exposure to different 
perspectives, enabling students to engage directly with such perspectives. A discursive teaching 
style is often utilised as a universal tool in CCE. The popularity of the concept reflects the 
normative belief shared by many scholars that teachers should engage students in critical 
discussions rather than teaching knowledge and fostering values top-down. Besides being praised 
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by scholars as a more participatory or even democratic way of teaching, the discursive teaching 
style is discussed as a more effective and sustainable approach generally and as a tool for fostering 
identity formation in particular (Flum & Kaplan, 2006; Waterman, 1989).  
Third, school participation is regarded as an important informal learning experience in the field 
of CCE (Deimel & Hahn-Laudenberg, 2017; Scheerens, 2009). It has long been recognised that 
experience of participation promotes identity formation. The reciprocal connections between 
engagement and identification are emerging with increasing clarity (Crocetti et al., 2014). 
Quintelier and van Deth (2014) conducted a longitudinal study and showed that the experience of 
participation had a greater impact on attitudes than vice versa. Attitudes such as self-efficacy are 
relevant for identity. But as the authors did not assess aspects of identity, we cannot conclude that 
these results refute the findings of Crocetti and their colleagues. We can, however, conclude that 
important reciprocal effects do exist. Where identity is concerned, participation can be seen as a 
relevant predictor, an outcome variable, and an aspect of political support itself. 
Fourth, fostering of positive relationships in schools is a CCE tool that is often overlooked and 
more explicitly discussed for its connection with bullying (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger & Ziemes, 2017). 
The relevance of positive social relationships for political support is mentioned in the literature on 
political culture, but it is seldom operationalised in studies on CCE. Identity formation is an 
inherently social activity (Erikson, 1959/1994, p. 94). Negative and violent social relationships are 
seen as a great risk to the formation of a stable and healthy identity which would be resilient 
against violent extremism (Moshman, 2011).  
Recent studies prove the importance of social relationships for creating trust in political 
institutions as a more specific aspect of political support (Ziemes, Hahn-Laudenberg & Abs, 2019). 
The school climate not only encompasses the relationships of students with each other, but also of 
students and teachers, and of teachers with one another. The way in which schools are physically, 
socially, and organisationally structured influences the development of political mindsets. This is 
also in line with Putnam (2000), who states that social experiences and attitudes are generalised. 
3 Research questions  
Drawing on the data regarding schooling and individual experiences contained in the ICCS 2016 
study, we will explore the relationship of national and European identities and explore the 
relevance of schools as a malleable context for the formation of identities. In our analyses, we will 
present descriptive statistics on national and European identities among students in European 
countries. Based on previous research, we expect a positive relationship and we assume that the 
relationship can be found in all participating countries (Hypothesis 1.1). Further, we assume that 
tolerance is more strongly associated with European than with national identity (Hypothesis 1.2). 
We also assume that the school context can be shown as an enabling condition for national and 
European identities in various ways. First, schools can provide students with curriculum content 
about Europe (Hypothesis 2). Second, as part of the characteristic of instruction, teachers can 
create spaces for discursive exchanges in the classroom (Hypothesis 3). Third, teachers can 
enhance participation (Hypothesis 4); and fourth, teachers can foster positive relationships with 
and among students (Hypothesis 5). Student and family background will be controlled for. In a 
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final step, we will also control for acquired civic knowledge and trust in political institutions to 
explore if the results are stable after controlling for these variables. 
4 Methods 
4.1 Sample 
The basis for the analyses is data taken from the International Civic and Citizenship Education 
Study 2016 (ICCS 2016). Extensive information on the sample and methodology used can be found 
in the international report (Schulz, et al., 2018), the European report (Losito, Agrusti, Damiani, & 
Schulz, 2018), and the technical report (Schulz, Carstens, Losito, & Fraillon, 2018). 
Overall, more than 94,000 students in more than 3,800 schools across 24 countries participated 
in the study cycle. Classes constituted the sampling unit. The target year was the eighth year of 
schooling, unless the age mean of that group was less than 13.5 years, in which case year 9 
became the target year. Selection was stratified to provide representativeness. In Europe, 15 
countries and education systems were part of the assessment, where students also filled out a 
regional European module. Norway participated in the module but was excluded from the 
analyses as it is not a member state of the European Union. We assume that the perception of 
European identity in Norway is not equivalent to that of students who expect to become legal 
citizens of the EU as political community. This means that in this instance we deviate from the 
procedure in the European report. 46,517 students were part of the resulting European 
subsample. The exact numbers, extracted from the technical report, are listed in Table 2. In 
Belgium, the Flemish region, and in Germany, the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) 
participated. Both regions have strong regional control over their educational policies. We 
included the data from NRW even though the sample did not meet the international sampling 
requirements. We assume the sample size to be sufficient for the analyses at hand. 
Notwithstanding, we implemented additional measures in order to ensure the robustness of our 
results. For instance, we achieved equivalent results with and without including sample weights. 
Further, the smaller sample size results in higher standard errors and higher thresholds for the 
tests of significance in this educational system.  
4.2 Measures 
The IEA performed Rasch analyses to create scale values, which are appended in the available 
dataset. In the previous ICCS 2009 cycle, scales were calibrated to an international mean of 50 and 
a standard deviation of 10. These scales, which were re-used in the 2016 cycle, were calibrated to 
these numbers to ensure comparability across study cycles, and therefore continue to cluster 
around the mean of 50. 
Three questionnaire modules were used in European countries. First, the timed student test 
was conducted. The second part was the student questionnaire, which contained all the scales 
used except the one on European identity. And finally, the scale on European identity was 
presented in the third module. Gender was captured through respondents’ self-assessments and 
adjusted with information provided by the school coordinators. The socioeconomic status (SES) 
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was assessed with questions regarding the parents’ highest occupation according to the ISCO-08 
classification, levels of parental education, and the number of books in the home. The SES 
indicator called NISB was calibrated to have a weighted average of zero in each country and to 
vary between plus and minus one. Students were categorised as having an immigration 
background (IMB) if the students themselves or at least one of the parents were born outside the 
country of residence. Here, we opted for a conception of IMB which is broader than the one used 
in the international ICCS 2016 report. The rate of students with immigration background varies 
greatly between the countries, from 3.5% in Bulgaria to 40% in NRW. 
For the analyses, we focus on explaining variances in the scales of European identity and 
national identity. The assessment framework distinguishes national identity (CNTATT) from 
uncritical patriotism and nationalism (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Losito, & Agrusti, 2016, p. 32). The 
items are presented in Table 1 and cover a range of items relating to identity, including affective 
and evaluative aspects of identification. The scale regarding European identity (EUIDENT) is 
presented in Table 1 as well, and the items explore the students’ feelings of connection. One item 
asks students to rate their European identity in comparison to a global identity. While this special 
item does not follow modern conceptualisations of identity which allow for hybridisation and 
complexity (Hahn-Laudenberg, Jasper & Abs, 2017; Jasper, Ziemes, & Abs, 2017), it was included 
by the IEA to increase the stability of analyses including data from ICCS 2009 and 2016. As no 
anchor items with the same wording exist in both the CNTATT and EUIDENT scales, comparisons of 
agreement rates or scale means are not informative.  
Two scales were used to measure tolerance. GENEQL measured attitudes towards gender 
equality, especially women’s rights, and employs six items. IMMRGHT focused on attitudes 
towards equal rights for immigrants; it uses five items. For both the GENEQL and the IMMRGHT 
scale, items could be answered on a 4-point Likert scale. 
We further used scales investigating the structure and/or content of educational provision. 
Two scales focused on students’ reports of instances of formal learning opportunities offered to 
them. The CIVLRN scale included seven items exploring learning opportunities concerning politics, 
mainly within the country of residence, while the EULRN scale included four items focusing on 
learning opportunities concerning European history and politics.  
OPDISC followed the tradition of scales investigating the openness of classroom discussions as 
a form of discursive classroom climate, indicating the opportunity for students to discuss political 
topics. SCHPART assessed students’ experiences of participation in school. Two scales assessed 
social relationships at school. STUTREL is the students’ perception of student-teacher relations, 
focusing on an evaluation of teachers’ fairness and benevolence. The scales included six and five 
items respectively. INTACT is a scale relating to students’ perception of student interaction in 
school. It employed four items to assess perceived levels of respectfulness in schools.  
INTRUST is an aspect of political support, and this scale assessed students’ trust in political 
institutions, such as parliament, courts of justice, and the police. It was introduced to control for 
the general performance of the political institutions within each country. One further item 
assessed students’ trust in the European Parliament. 
We also considered civic knowledge as one central dimension of the political mindset. The civic 
proficiency test (PVCIV) employed a rotating booklet design to assess students’ levels of civic 
knowledge and reasoning abilities (Schulz et al., 2018). 
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5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive results 
Descriptive results have been publicised previously (Jasper, Ziemes, & Abs, 2017; Losito et al., 
2018; Schulz et al., 2018) and are listed in Table 2 to present a comprehensive picture regarding 
the research questions. We find that the country means of both national and European identity 
scales differ substantially between countries.  
Analyses were conducted with the IDB Analyzer (IEA, 2018) which provides Macros for SPSS 
(IBM, 2013) to employ weights and calculate the appropriate standard error. The overall mean of 
national identity is 47.81 scale points. The country averages range from 43.63 in NRW to 51.91 
scale points in Bulgaria. Together, Belgium, the Netherlands, and NRW constitute a regional cluster 
of countries with rather low national identity. The countries with higher values — Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Malta and Finland — do not, however, constitute a regional cluster.  
The mean score for European identity is 53.03. The country means reflect the differences 
observed for national identity, ranging from 48.33 in Latvia to 56.03 in Finland. The European 
identity scale values are especially low in Latvia, Bulgaria, and NRW, and especially high in Croatia, 
Finland, and Slovenia. In all countries, a significant positive correlation between national and 
European identity could be found at the p < .001 level. The coefficients ranged from .24 in Bulgaria 
to .50 in Estonia. The average correlation was .37, indicating a relevant positive connection 
between both variables. We find no evidence for the assumption that national and European 
identities are conflicting in any country; on the contrary, they seem to be complementary overall 
among the adolescents in the European countries assessed.  
In all countries, levels of support for gender equality and for immigrants’ rights were only 
weakly associated with identities (|r| < .30). The largest correlations could be found in Estonia; 
here support for gender equality correlates at .24 with national, and at .21 with European identity. 
In Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, and Malta, support for immigrant rights correlated at .20 with 
European identity. In the majority of countries, correlations between European identity and 
tolerance scales where somewhat stronger than correlations with national identity. In NRW and 
Sweden, a negative connection of national identity and attitudes towards the rights of immigrants 
emerged. The data thus supports Hypothesis 1.1 strongly and Hypothesis 1.2 rather weakly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ziemes, Hahn-Laudenberg, Abs 
              
 
 
 
 
 
European and national identity 
           
 
 
 
  17  
 
 
Table 2 
Sample information, mean identity scores, and correlation of identity scores 
   
National 
Identity 
European  
Identity 
r (national 
identity, European 
identity) 
 Schools Students M SE M SE r SE 
Belgium (Flemish) 162 2.931 45.35 0.20 52.14 0.28 .36* .02 
Bulgaria 147 2.966 51.91 0.28 51.96 0.30 .24* .03 
Croatia 175 3.896 50.66 0.26 55.46 0.28 .31* .02 
Denmark 184 6.254 47.37 0.20 52.80 0.18 .37* .02 
Estonia 164 2.857 48.20 0.34 53.22 0.28 .50* .02 
Finland 179 3.173 51.22 0.21 56.03 0.22 .37* .02 
Germany (NRW)1 59 1.451 43.63 0.33 50.55 0.34 .37* .03 
Italy 170 3.450 46.04 0.20 54.14 0.21 .44* .02 
Latvia 147 3.224 47.48 0.32 48.33 0.25 .39* .02 
Lithuania 182 3.631 47.54 0.26 53.53 0.26 .36* .02 
Malta 47 3.764 50.48 0.18 54.00 0.18 .36* .02 
Netherlands 123 2.812 45.49 0.28 51.99 0.32 .41* .03 
Slovenia 145 2.844 47.93 0.24 54.80 0.22 .39* .02 
Sweden 155 3.264 46.10 0.26 53.47 0.30 .33* .02 
Overall 2.039 46.517 47.81 0.07 53.03 0.07 .37* .01 
Note. * indicates p < .05; 1did not meet sample participation requirements; results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
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Table 2 (continued)  
Sample information, mean identity scores, and correlation of identity scores 
 r (national 
identity, gender 
equality) 
r (European 
identity, gender 
equality) 
r (national 
identity, 
immigrant rights) 
r (European 
identity, 
immigrant rights 
 r SE r SE r SE r SE 
Belgium (Flemish) .07* .03 .10* .03 .03 .03 .01 .03 
Bulgaria .04 .02 .05* .02 .06* .02 .20* .02 
Croatia -.02 .02 .06* .02 .10* .02 .20* .02 
Denmark .08* .02 .13* .02 -.03 .02 .09* .02 
Estonia .24* .02 .21* .02 .04 .02 .10* .03 
Finland -.03 .02 .08* .02 -.07* .02 .10* .02 
Germany (NRW)1 .02 .03 .13* .04 -.12* .05 .01 .03 
Italy -.05* .02 .05* .02 .10* .02 .13* .02 
Latvia .11* .02 .13* .02 -.03 .03 .10* .02 
Lithuania .06* .03 .12* .02 .16* .02 .20* .02 
Malta .10* .02 .11* .02 .07* .02 .20* .02 
Netherlands .08* .03 .05* .02 .03 .03 .05 .03 
Slovenia .10* .02 .07* .02 .13* .02 .17* .02 
Sweden -.05* .02 .06* .02 -.10* .02 .06* .02 
Overall .05* .01 .10* .01 .03* .01 .12* .01 
Note. * indicates p < .05; 1did not meet sample participation requirements; results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
5.2 Regressions 
Before proceeding with regression analyses, Intra Class Correlations (ICCs) were calculated with 
Mplus 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2018). In multi-group, two-level analyses, the ICCs for national 
identity ranged from .045 in Denmark to .265 in Estonia, averaging .091. For European identity the 
ICCs ranged from .035 in NRW to .179 in Estonia, averaging .068. A three-level-analysis for national 
identity revealed an ICC of .092 at class level and of .056 at country level. For European identity, 
the ICC at class level was .066 and at country level .033. While these analyses indicate that a 
relevant but mostly small amount of variance can be found at class level, they also indicate the 
great differences between countries, especially concerning national identity.  
Because previous research did not indicate a great relevance of the classroom and because the 
present research focus lay withe individual level analyses, we opted to use the IDB Analyzer to 
perform a separate calculation for each country. This decision was also driven by a restriction of 
Mplus, which is not yet able to utilize jackknife zones and weights in multi-level analyses which 
would be needed to calculate the standard error of the estimation of population values. For these 
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analyses, we deemed the standard error to be of greater relevance than controlling for effects at 
the classroom level. 
To answer the question of which variables can predict national and European identity, linear 
regressions were calculated. Table 3 presents the results of the regression analyses. Regressions 
were conducted separately for each country and each identity aspect. New variables were added 
cumulatively. In this way, 135 separate regressions were calculated overall. Table 3 presents the 
mean regression coefficient for all countries, the standard error of this estimation, and a summary 
on the number of countries in which the regression coefficient is significant and positive, negative 
or not significant at the p < .05 level.  
The first set of analyses included sociodemographic variables, namely gender, the immigration 
background and the socioeconomic status of the students. In six out of the fourteen European 
countries, being female was a negative predictor of national identity. In all countries, students 
with an immigration background reported a lower national identity than their peers (βx ̅= -.15). 
Note that the rate and composition of immigration background vary greatly between countries. In 
our further analyses, we consider immigration background more as a control than an analysis 
variable. The effect of socioeconomic status was negative in seven countries and positive in two 
countries. A similar picture emerged concerning European identity. In eight countries, being a girl 
predicted lower identification with Europe. In twelve countries, immigration background was 
associated with lesser levels of European identity (βx ̅= -.11). A higher socioeconomic status was 
associated with greater levels of European identity in two countries.  
The second set of models introduced variables that are malleable in the school context. This 
included a discursive teaching style, social relationships with other students and teachers, and the 
experiences of participation in school. Further, opportunities for learning about politics or about 
Europe were introduced to predict national or European identity respectively. The results of the 
sociodemographic variables were rather similar to those presented for Hypothesis 1. 
Opportunities for learning about politics were positively associated with national identity in eleven 
countries (βx̅ = .08). An open classroom climate was positively associated with national identity in 
three countries and negatively in two countries. The relationship of students with other students 
(βx̅ = .14) and with teachers (βx̅ = .13) predicted national identity in all 14 countries. Experiences of 
participation in school predicted national identity in six of the fourteen countries (βx̅ = .06).  
For European identity, the picture was rather similar. Opportunities for learning about Europe 
predicted European identity in all countries (βx ̅= .19), discursive teaching style in three (βx ̅= .01), 
and opportunities for participation (βx ̅= .04) in six countries. In all countries, a good relationship of 
students with other students (βx ̅= .10) and with teachers (βx ̅= .09) contributed to European 
identity. The explained variance varied greatly between the countries. For national identity, the 
explained variance ranged from .07 in Sweden to .24 in Estonia. For European identity, the 
explained variance ranged from .08 in Sweden to .15 in Malta.  
In a final step, the variables ‘trust in political institutions’ and ‘civic knowledge’ were 
introduced. For national identity, trust in political institutions was revealed to be an important 
predictor in all countries (βx ̅= .25), while civic knowledge was a predictor of national identity in 
one country and less so in seven countries (βx ̅= -.01). All other variables lost some predictive 
power, but the interaction of students and teachers was still significant in 12 out of 14 countries. 
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The explained variance ranged from .10 (Sweden) to .30 (Estonia). Trust in the European 
Parliament predicted a stronger European identity (βx ̅= .18), while civic knowledge, again, 
remained rather irrelevant (βx ̅= .01). Relationships of students with other students lost its 
predictive power in five countries, and relationships between students and teachers in two 
countries. In this model, explained variance ranged from .10 (Sweden) to .30 (Estonia). 
6 Discussion 
This study aims to reveal the relevance of the malleable school context in shaping national and 
European identities. We presented a multidisciplinary theoretical approach, which included 
approaches from psychology, political culture, and the CCE. Each perspective provided a relevant 
point of view on the matter of national and European identity. We inspected each education 
system separately. This enabled us to estimate population values and the associated standard 
errors with field data of high external validity. Overall, the relationships between variables varied 
little among countries, but there were some outliers. Especially the Estonian coefficients were 
often higher. This was probably due to the linguistic and population segregation of Estonian and 
Russian schools, which goes hand in hand with different orientations towards Estonia and Europe. 
The analyses demonstrated the relevance of formal lectures for building a European identity, and 
of social relationships for building national and European identities. We further found national 
identity to be marginally positively related to measures of tolerance in many countries, and 
European identity somewhat more positively correlated to those values in most countries. Overall, 
the correlations were rather small and therefore indicated no bivariate pull of identity towards 
tolerance or intolerance with the measures used. 
As was expected based on previous studies, immigration background and being a girl negatively 
predicted both forms of identity. Socioeconomic background was of little relevance in the linear 
regressions. In accordance with the theory on complex identities and with earlier results, we found 
national and European identity to be mutually compatible for students in all inspected European 
countries. There was no dilemma of the national versus the European identity, and this effect was 
quite robust. Formal provision of relevant curriculum content proved to be relevant for identity 
formation. This was especially true for the European identity, where the strongest prediction could 
be found. Opportunities for acquiring more general political knowledge were not that universally 
relevant for the prediction of national identity.  
We assume that questions of belonging to the country of residence are rooted to a stronger 
extent in everyday life, the media, and the curriculum, while questions concerning Europe still 
depend more strongly on explicit inclusion of the topic in school. The relevance of formal learning 
opportunities about Europe underlines the need for teachers to be qualified to understand, teach, 
and discuss the challenging and dynamic topic of Europe (Oberle & Forstmann, 2015).  
We found that a discursive teaching style had little to no impact. As the study is cross-sectional, 
we have no information on development trajectories. Marcia (1966) suggests that a phase of 
disengagement follow previously held unelected identity aspects; therefore, the small regression 
coefficients do not refute the theory that formal and informal learning opportunities in school are 
important for identity formation. Similarly, participation had only marginal relevance for national 
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or European identity. Putnam’s theory of social capital and social identity theory revealed to be 
fruitful for the study. The results support the relevance of social relationships for political support 
for national and supranational political structures. The positive relationships within the school 
environment seem to foster in-group cohesion concerning the nation, which is an aspect of 
political support. 
The substantial differences of explained variance across countries indicate the importance of 
country-specific analyses. Results remain mostly stable after controlling for trust in political 
institutions as an indicator of more specific political support, and of civic knowledge as the ability 
to cognitively evaluate individual belonging to political communities. 
There are multiple limitations to the study. First, we used cross-sectional data, which means 
that no causal relationships can be identified with the data at hand. Still, theoretical arguments 
were presented to argue which variables are appropriate for use as predictors. Further, ICCS 2016 
does not include variables on exchange programmes and European foreign language education, 
which have long been recognised as fostering identification with European identity (Faas, 2007). 
Finally, many coefficients and the amount of explained variance are rather small. While this can 
partly be attributed to the limitations inherent in the field data, we have to assume that further 
variables, which may not directly be linked to schooling, would be strong predictors.  
Our research questions focused on the effects of schooling, and while the variables we used 
cover a rich variety of important aspects of schooling, they may not be exhaustive. For instance, 
the quality of content and instruction are not assessed. Further analyses should include 
longitudinal and multi-level analyses. The latter were not in the scope of this paper but could 
reveal interesting further options for analysis. While the present analyses focus on the individual 
assessment of learning opportunities, social relationships, and the extent to which the classroom 
provides a climate for open discussion, multi-level analyses may yield additional insights. The role 
of social relationships for (supra)national identities needs further conceptual and empirical 
investigation.  
Further, the results give us no information about the role of social relationships in school in 
fostering a transformative citizenship capable of promote changes for social justice. Norris (2011) 
and Banks (2017) believe that fundamental system attachment is productive for the critical 
assessment and change of institutions’ democratisation. The person-centred analyses by Landberg 
et al. (2018) indicate that a group of students with little identification with their country of 
residence or Europe are very tolerant and willing to participate despite their lack of interest in 
political issues. Still, they find that dual-identified students are the most likely to be interested in 
politics and to participate. It could be fruitful to investigate if, and how many, students participate 
in working towards social cohesion and justice as result of their support for core values without, 
however, identifying with the overarching political structures. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that identity complexity is not conceptually linked to national nor European identity. Students who 
identify with neither can still develop complex identities which are linked to tolerance, especially if 
those identities are linked to values of tolerance. 
We can deduce some implications for CCE. Overarching identities are compatible, but not 
inherently linked to tolerance. Teachers have the opportunity to explicitly link notions of identity 
to tolerance. The provision of relevant content in formal education is of great relevance if one 
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follows the goal of fostering a European identity. These formal learning opportunities are less 
important for national identity. The development of positive relationships in school is highly 
relevant for the formation of identities. Formal (social science) education can enable students to 
reflect on their identities and to develop a critical form of national identity which supports stability 
as well as change of the political system. Teachers should not pit different identity aspects against 
one another but foster identity complexity. Schools may play an important role in fostering 
identities which encompass tolerance, a critical perspective on institutions, and the pursuit of 
social justice which empowers and motivates students to participate in the changes they desire. As 
discussed, several scholars warn against fostering national identity as they believe it is connected 
to the devaluation of outgroups. Empirically, we cannot support this claim with the analyses at 
hand. Our results imply that students who experience a positive social climate at school—whereby 
it is generally agreed that a positive social climate at school is highly desirable—will develop a 
balanced national and European identity. These identities imply neither tolerance nor intolerance.  
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Table 3 
Regression analyses for national and European identity 
 National Identity Countries European Identity Countries 
Model 1    β x ̅/ b x ̅ SE + / n.s. /    β x ̅/ b x̅     SE + / n.s. / - 
Gender -.05 / -0.85 .01 / 0.11 0 / 8 / 6 -.06 / -1.15 .01 / 0.12 0 / 6 / 8 
IMB -.15 / -3.82 .01 / 0.17 0 / 0 / 14 -.11 / -2.71 .01 / 0.16 0 / 2 / 12 
SES -.02 .01 2 / 6 / 7 [.04 .01 3 / 11 / 0 
R² [.04 .00 .01 to .11 [.02 .00 .00 to .07 
       
Model 2    β x ̅/ b x ̅ SE + / n.s. / -   β x ̅/ b x̅ SE + / n.s. / - 
Gender -.06 / -1.12 .01 / 0.10 0 / 6 / 8 -.06 / -1.23 .01 / 0.12 0 / 4 / 10 
IMB -.14 / -3.46  .01 / 0.16 0 / 0 / 14 -.10 / -2.44 .01 / 0.16 0 / 2 / 12 
SES -.04 .01 1 / 6 / 7 [.03  .01 4 / 8 / 0 
CIVLRN [.08 .01 11 / 3 / 0    
EULRN    [.19 .01 14 / 0 / 0 
OPDISC [.02 .01 3 / 9 / 2 [.01 .01 3 / 11 / 0 
STUTREL [.14 .01 14 / 0 / 0 [.10 .01 14 / 0 / 0 
INTACT [.13 ,01 14 / 0 / 0 [.09 .01 14 / 0 / 0 
SCHPART [.06 .01 6 / 8 / 0  [.04 .01 6 / 8 / 0 
R² [.13 .00 .07 to .24 .11 .00 .07 to .15 
       
Model 3   β x̅ / b x̅ SE + / n.s. / -   β x ̅/ b x̅ SE + / n.s. / - 
Gender -.06 / -1.04 .01 / 0.10 0 / 6 / 8  -.05 / -1.01 .01 / 0.12 0 / 8 / 6 
IMB -.14 / -3.32 .01 / 0.15 0 / 0 / 14 -.09 / -2.25 .01 / 0.15 0 / 12 / 2 
SES -.02 .01 1 / 8 / 5 [.03 .01 0 / 12 / 2 
CIVLRN [.06 .01 10 / 4 / 0    
EULRN    [.17 .01 14 / 0 / 0 
OPDISC [.03 .01 2 / 12 / 0 [.00 .01 0 / 13 / 1 
STUTREL [.09 .01 12 / 2 / 0 [.08 .01 9 / 5 / 0 
INTACT [.09 .01 14 / 0 / 0  [.07 .01 12 / 2 / 0 
SCHPART [.06 .01 8 / 6 / 0 [.04 .01 6 / 8 / 0 
INTRUST [.25 .01 14 / 0 / 0    
TRUST EU 
Parliament    [.18 .01 0 / 0 / 14 
PC_CIV -.01 .01 1 / 6 / 7 [.00 .01 2 / 7 / 5 
       
R.² [.18 .03 .10 to .30 [.14 .00 .10 to .20 
Note. + /n.s. / - Number of countries with significant positive / not significant / negative regression coefficients.  
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